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COMMENT
Military Burn Pits in Iraq and Afghanistan:
Considerations and Obstacles for Emerging
Litigation
KATE DONOVAN KURERA
SUMMARY
This comment analyzes and discusses aspects of the
ongoing KBR Burn Pit Litigation, 1 an emerging toxic tort in the
United States. The litigation is in response to alleged toxic
smoke exposures from burn pits operated by government
contactors at military bases in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
comment first discusses the alleged exposures and health
concerns related to the inhalation of burn pit smoke. Next, the
comment explains the regulatory framework surrounding the use
of burn pits abroad and the incorporation of this framework into
military logistics contracts. The comment next discusses the
various legal challenges and obstacles Plaintiffs face in pursuing
this not so garden-variety toxic tort case. There are many legal
defenses uniquely present that overshadow the typical toxic tort
hurdles, such as causation, because Defendants are government
contractors. In the context of exploring the defenses, the type and
scope of military contracts become relevant to establishing
potential governmental contractor immunity because these are
the contracts that Plaintiffs contend were breached with the
negligent operation of burn pits. The comment concludes by
suggesting that the tests available for evaluating liability under
military logistics contracts are inadequate, resulting in unclear
standards for a reviewing court to apply to Burn Pit Litigation
claims.

1. The litigation was renamed “In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litigation” by the
Multidistrict Litigation Panel (“MDL”) upon request of plaintiffs. See J.P.M.L.
Transfer Order, No. 2083 (Oct. 16, 2009).
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INTRODUCTION

Burn pits have been relied on heavily as a waste disposal
method at military installations in Iraq and Afghanistan since
the beginning of United States military presence in these
Department of
countries in 2001 and 2003, respectively. 2
Defense (“DoD”) contracting companies, KBR, Inc., Kellogg,
Brown & Root LLC, and Halliburton Co. (“KBR” or “Defendants”),
through high-profit logistics defense contracts, 3 provide the
majority of contingency base operational services in Iraq and
Afghanistan (e.g., potable drinking water and food services, waste
disposal services, medical services, recreational facilities, and
other services related to base operation and maintenance.) 4 Until
recently, little attention had been paid to the waste disposal
methods utilized in the military war theaters in Iraq and
Afghanistan. This dramatically changed when Joshua Eller, a
computer technician deployed in Iraq, filed suit in 2008 against
KBR for negligently exposing thousands of soldiers, former KBR
employees, and civilians to unsafe conditions due to “faulty waste
disposal systems.” 5 Eller and a group of more than two hundred
plaintiffs (“Plaintiffs”) returning from their tours of duty,
attribute chronic illnesses, disease, and even death to exposure to
thick black and green toxic burn pit smoke that descended into
their living quarters and interfered with military operations. 6
2. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), NO. GAO-11-63, AFGHANISTAN
AND IRAQ: DOD SHOULD IMPROVE ADHERENCE TO ITS GUIDANCE ON OPEN PIT
BURNING AND SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT 8 (OCT. 2010).

3. Complaint ¶ 16, Eller v. KBR, Inc., No. 4:08-cv-03495 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 26,
2008) (alleging that KBR revenue from the logistics contracts for Iraq operations
was 4.7 billion for 2006). The profits KBR received from government contracts
has been subject to much media attention. See David Rose, The People vs. the
Profiteers, Vanity Fair, Nov. 2007.
4. Complaint ¶¶ 16-17, Eller v. KBR, Inc., No. 4:08-cv-03495 (S.D. Tex. Nov.
26, 2008).
5. Complaint ¶ 1 Eller v. KBR, Inc., No. 4:08-cv-03495 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 26,
2008).
6. Complaint ¶¶ 22-23, Bittel v. KBR, Inc., No. 3:09-cv-05041 (W.D. Mo.
May 29, 2009); see also Complaint, Oches v. KBR, Inc., No. 5:09-cv-00237
(E.D.N.C. Apr. 2009). Plaintiffs, Staff Sgt. Steven Oches and Staff Sgt. Matt
Bumpus, now deceased, were both stationed at Joint Base Balad in 2004 and
regularly inhaled fumes from the burn pit. In 2006, both service men developed
a rare, aggressive form of leukemia, and both died in 2008 within less than a

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss1/7

2

07 DONOVANMACRO

290

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

1/5/2011 3:13 AM

[Vol. 28

Plaintiffs assert that they witnessed batteries, plastics, biohazard
materials, solvents, asbestos, chemical and medical wastes, items
doused with diesel fuel, and even human remains being dumped
into open burn pits. 7 DoD officials say this waste stream
contained items now prohibited pursuant to revised guidelines. 8
Plaintiffs contend that KBR breached these contracts by
negligently operating burn pits.
The Burn Pit Litigation certainly raises larger issues
concerning the import of environmental and safety standards
utilized during wartime settings. However it is the litigation that
seeks to answer a more fundamental question of who should be
held responsible for the alleged injuries.
While U.S. law
expressly prohibits using burn pits for waste disposal, 9 the use of
burn pits in Iraq and Afghanistan highlights the disparity in the
application of environmental laws, regulations, and standards at
overseas military contingency operational bases. One paramedic
in Iraq noted this contrast, stating, “there is no such thing as the
EPA here,” 10 while another soldier blogged, “[t]here is no way on
Earth [the operation of burn pits] would ever be allowed back
home . . . but hey, we’re not at home, so it must be OK, right?” 11

month of each other. Leo Shane III, Families, DOD Spar Over Dangers of Burn
Pit
Smoke,
Stars
and
Stripes,
Nov.
6,
2009,
http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=65885.
7. Complaint ¶ 12, Bittel v. KBR, Inc., No. 3:09-cv-05041 (W.D. Mo. May 29,
2009).
8. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NO. GAO-11-63, HIGHLIGHTS,
AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: DOD SHOULD IMPROVE ADHERENCE TO ITS GUIDANCE ON
OPEN PIT BURNING AND SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT (OCT. 2010).
9. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) prohibits open dumping
and open burning of solid waste. See 42 U.S.C. § 6945 (2006); 40 C.F.R. § 257.37(a); 40 C.F.R. § 258.24(b).
10. Dina Fine Maron, Air Pollution: ‘There’s no such thing as the EPA here’,
(Nov.
11,
2009),
http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/
GREENWIRE
2009/11/11/1.
11. Kelly Kennedy, Burn Pit at Balad Raises Health Concerns, ARMY TIMES
(Oct. 29, 2008), http://www.armytimes.com/news/2008/10/military_burnpit_
102708w/.
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II. ALLEDGED EXPOSURES AND HEALTH
CONCERNS
The exposure to burn pits has generated complaints from
service members since 2003, 12 but the health impacts from
exposure are largely unknown. 13 While complaints identify
exposure to burn pits throughout Iraq and Afghanistan (as of
August 2010 there were an estimated two hundred and fifty one
burns pits operating in Afghanistan and twenty two in Iraq,)14
media attention has primarily focused on the burn pit operating
at Joint Base Balad in Iraq, which was suspected of burning two
hundred and forty tons of waste a day at peak operation. 15 In a
2006 memorandum, Air Force Lt. Col. Darrin Curtis, a former
bioenvironmental flight commander at Joint Base Balad,
identified the burn pit as an “acute health hazard for
individuals,” and noted “it is amazing that the burn pit has been
able to operate without restrictions over the past few years
without significant engineering controls. . .” 16 Curtis detailed the
health hazards associated with inhalation of smoke from
unsorted refuse and commented that the threats from open
incineration of mixed wastes today pose more serious risks. 17 Air
Force Lt. Col. James Elliott co-signed the Curtis memorandum,
adding, “the known carcinogens and respiratory sensitizer
released into the atmosphere by the burn pit present both an
acute and a chronic health hazard to our troops and the local
population.” 18 Even publications from the Air Force Institute for
Operational Health state that open burning of refuse mixtures
12. U.S. ARMY CTR. FOR HEALTH PROMOTION AND PREVENTIVE MEDICINE
(USACHPPM), NO. 47-002-1208, JUST THE FACTS: BALAD BURN PIT (2008).
13. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NO. GAO-11-63, HIGHLIGHTS,
AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: DOD SHOULD IMPROVE ADHERENCE TO ITS GUIDANCE ON
OPEN PIT BURNING AND SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT (OCT. 2010).
14. Id.
15. Kelly Kennedy, War-zone Burn Pits Violate Laws, GAO says, ARMY TIMES,
Oct. 17, 2010, http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/10/military-gao-says-burnpits-violate-laws-101410w/.
16. Memorandum from Darrin L. Curtis, Lt. Col., Dep’t of Air Force, to Dep’t
of Air Force, 332d. Air Expeditionary Wing, Balad Air Base Iraq, 1-2 (Dec. 20,
2006).
17. Id.
18. Id.
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containing trash, medical wastes, and plastics can “yield a
hazardous operation with potential impacts to human health and
environment.” 19
According to the U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion
and Preventive Medicine (“USACHPPM”), sampling was
conducted at Joint Base Balad at different times from 2003
through 2007; however, it was not until 2007 that a formalized
sampling protocol was employed. 20 USACHPPM’s sampling
events indicated the presence of harmful pollutants such as
“dioxins, polyaromatic hydrocarbons, [and] volatile organic
compounds,” but all reportedly within acceptable ranges, based
USACHPPM
on Military Exposure Guidelines (“MEG”). 21
maintains in its reports that exposure to the burn pit smoke does
not pose long-term health effects. 22 USACHPPM’s assessments
were particularly concerned with testing for dioxins, which is the
pollutant most commonly associated with Agent Orange used
during the Vietnam War. 23
During a November 2009 Senate Democratic Policy
Committee Hearing on military burn pits abroad, USACHPPM’s
studies were called into question by Dr. Anthony Szema, Chief of
the Allergy Section of Veterans Affairs Medical Center. 24 Dr.
Szema, testified that the USACHPPM’s assessments were fatally
flawed since they did not include data about particulate matter. 25
Dr. Szema noted that “the size of particulate matter is important
to consider because the particles act as a carrier of various
harmful chemicals in the air;. . .[t]he smaller the particulate
matter, the deeper the particles are able to travel into the lungs,”
posing a number of health risks. 26 Dr. Szema testified that the
health risks from exposure to particulate matter include not only
19. AIR FORCE INST. FOR OPERATIONAL HEALTH, OPEN PIT BURNING GENERAL
FACTS AND INFORMATION 2 (2004).
20. USACHPPM, supra note 12, at 1.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. AIR FORCE INST. FOR OPERATIONAL HEALTH, supra note 19, at 2.
24. Are Burn Pits Making Our Soldiers Sick?: Hearing Before the S.
Democratic Policy Comm., 111th Cong. 2-3 (2009) (statement of Dr. Anthony
Szema, Chief of the Allergy Section, Veterans Affairs Medical Center).
25. Id. at 2.
26. Id.
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“risk of asthma, bronchitis, and emphysema,. . .but there is also
an association with respiratory and cardiovascular mortality—
death—from inhalation of ultra fine particulate matter. . .” 27 Dr.
Szema warned that the toxicity of particulate matter depends on
the compounds it is carrying, and therefore, it is necessary to
always include in air quality analysis. 28 Lt. Col. Curtis also
criticized the sampling methodologies, claiming the wind patterns
make accurate data collection nearly “impossible.” 29
For months after the initial filing of the complaints, DoD did
not officially comment on the situation, except to restate its
position that “only minor, temporary effects have been identified
with the burn pit smoke.” 30 DoD has since “acknowledge[d] that
burn pit smoke causes acute health effects in some people,” but “it
is less clear what other longer-term health effects may be
associated with burn pit smoke inhalation.” 31
III. REGULATION OF BURN PITS IN MILITARY
WARTIME OPERATIONS
A complex web of international treaties, Status of Forces
Agreements (“SOFAs”), U.S. domestic laws and regulations, and
DoD instructions, directives, and technical manuals govern DoD
actions overseas.
Although international treaties create
standards for protocol at the highest level, the United States does
not participate in many relevant treaties and often does not

27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Kelly Kennedy, Balad Burn Pit Harmed Troops Living 1 Mile Away,
ARMY TIMES (Jan. 23, 2010), http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/01/
military_burn_pit_011810w/.
30. Leo Shane III, Families, DOD Spar Over Dangers of Burn Pit Smoke,
AND
STRIPES,
Nov.
6,
2009,
http://www.stripes.com/
STARS
article.asp?section=104&article=65885 (quoting Dr. R. Craig Postlewaite, Acting
Dir., DoD Force Health Prot. and Readiness Programs).
31. Kelly Kennedy, DoD shows first signs of acknowledging burn-pit woes,
Navy Times, Jan. 18, 2010 (quoting E-mail from Dr. R. Craig Postlewaite,
Acting Dir., DoD Force Health Prot. and Readiness Programs, to Military Times
(Dec. 21, 2009)), http://www.navytimes.com/news/2010/01/military_burn_pit_
pentagon_011810w/.)
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recognize international law at all. 32 This practice complicates
matters and creates ambiguity regarding applicable standards. 33
DoD regularly enters into SOFAs, which seek to establish a legal
framework for applying foreign laws to U.S. military personnel
operating in a foreign country. 34 SOFAs, however, are generally
only peacetime agreements that allow the U.S. military forces to
operate within the host country and are rarely applied in wartime
scenarios. 35
Additionally, there are few obligations for DoD to protect
human health and the environment through U.S. environmental
laws and regulations, since most U.S. environmental laws and
regulations do not have extraterritorial application. For example,
while the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) 36 (a
U.S. domestic law that regulates solid and hazardous waste
disposal and open burning operations) does not have an express
exterritorial provision, the extraterritorial applicability of RCRA
has been the subject of some litigation. Generally, parties have
not been successful in overcoming the extraterritorial standard
established in Foley Brothers v. Filardo. 37 In Foley Brothers, the
court held “unless a contrary intent appears” there maintains a
strong presumption that domestic law applies within the
territorial limits of the Unite States. 38 Because RCRA’s language
and legislative history do not suggest that Congress intended to
allow exterritorial application of the citizen suit provision, courts
have barred such application. 39
32. See e.g. Sharron J. Philo, Office of General Counsel, Defense Logistics
Agency, Presentation at the Overseas Hazardous Waste Disposal and Readiness
Workshop: Basics of the Basel Convention (July 13, 2000) (noting that the U.S.
is signatory, but a non-party, to the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal).
33. Id.
34. R. CHUCK MASON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT
(SOFA): WHAT IS IT, AND HOW HAS IT BEEN UTILIZED? 1 (2009).
35. Id.; see also Status-of-Forces Agreement [SOFA], GLOBALSECURITY.ORG,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/ sofa.htm (last visited Dec. 1,
2009).
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92 (2006).
37. See Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
38. Id. at 285.
39. See Amlon Metals Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668, 674-75 (S.D.N.Y.
1991).
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The difficulty of applying U.S. environmental laws abroad
results in DoD governing its actions abroad with its own policies,
directives, instructions, and program and field manuals, which
may or may not have legally binding effects. 40 DoD Instruction
4715.05, Management of Environmental Compliance at Overseas
Installations (“DODI 4715.05”), implements policy, assigns
responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for establishing
environmental compliance standards at DoD installations in
foreign countries. 41 The instruction directs DoD to establish
Final Governing Standards (“FGS”) as the governing
environmental criteria for overseas installations. 42 FGS are a
comprehensive set of country-specific substantive provisions,
typically articulated as technical limitations on effluent
discharges or emissions, or a specific management practice
specified by the host nation. 43 FGS are developed based on host
country laws and requirements, as long as the applicable hostnation’s environmental standards are at least as protective of
human health and the environment as the standards outlined in
the Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance Document
The OEBGD, developed pursuant to DODI
(“OEBGD”). 44
4715.05, creates baseline environmental standards applicable to
DoD installations, facilities, and actions in the U.S. and
incorporates the requirements of U.S. law that have
extraterritorial application. 45 Since many U.S. environmental
40. “Generally, whether a particular agency proceeding announces a rule or a
general policy statement depends upon whether the agency action establishes a
binding norm. The key inquiry, therefore, is the extent to which the challenged
policy leaves the agency free to exercise its discretion to follow or not to follow
that general policy in an individual case, or on the other hand, whether the
policy so fills out the statutory scheme that upon application one need only
determine whether a given case is within the rule's criterion. As long as the
agency remains free to consider the individual facts in the various cases that
arise, then the agency in question has not established a binding norm.” Nat’l
Mining Ass'n v. Sec’y of Labor, 589 F.3d 1368, 1371 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 716 F.2d 1369, 1377 (11th Cir. 1983)).
41. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Instruction 4715.5, Management of Environmental
Compliance at Overseas Installations ¶ 1.2 (1996) [hereinafter DoDI 4715.5].
42. Id. ¶ 4.1.
43. Id. ¶ E2.1.1.
44. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, GUIDANCE 4715.05-G, OVERSEAS ENVIRONMENTAL
BASELINE GUIDANCE DOCUMENT, ¶ C.1.1. (2007) [hereinafter DoD 4715.05-G].
45. Id.
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laws do not have extraterritorial application, the OEBGD
outlines minimum environmental standards and criteria based on
domestic standards. The OEBGD is used to develop FGS within
a host county and, in and of itself, can serve as the governing
document when host country environmental standards and
requirements are not present or less stringent. 46
It is at the level of the OEBGD that basic guidance
regarding the use of burn pits is provided. The OEBGD calls for
installations to develop and implement a solid waste
management strategy focused on recycling and waste
minimization, and states, “open burning will not be the regular
method of solid waste disposal.” 47 Additionally, the OEBGD
explicitly prohibits the use of open burning when installations
operate a Municipal Solid Waste Landfill Unit. 48 The Defense
Material Disposition Manual (1997) further articulates that since
installations overseas do not possess RCRA permits for hazardous
waste storage and disposal, overseas installations must “comply
with the OEBGD or DoD Executive Agent’s FGS for the
particular host nation in which the installation is located.” 49
Similarly, Army guidelines on field waste management state that
open burning can lead to significant environmental exposures to
troops and “open burning. . .should only be used in emergency
situations . . . [and] should be conducted as far downwind as
possible . . . from troop locations and living areas.” 50 The
guidelines further explain that no hazardous wastes should be
incinerated, since such burning can release toxic gases. 51 In
2006, DoD further discouraged the use of burn pits by issuing a
fragmentary order (“FRAGO”) incorporated into a document

46. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Manual 4160.21-M, Defense Materiel Disposition
Manual 10-1 (1997) [hereinafter DoD 4160.21-M].
47. DoD 4715.05-G, supra note 44, ¶ C7.3.13.
48. DoD 4715.05-G, supra note 44, ¶ C7.3.12.5. (providing limited exceptions
to the prohibition of open burning for infrequent burning of agricultural wastes,
silvicultural wastes, land-clearing debris, diseased trees, or debris from
emergency clean-up operations.)
49. DoD 4160.21-M, supra note 46, § 10-1.
50. U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, TECHNICAL BULLETIN MED 593, GUIDELINES FOR
FIELD WASTE MANAGEMENT, 7 (2006) [hereinafter TB MED 593].
51. Id.
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entitled the MNC-I Environmental Standard Operating
Procedure 2006. 52
All of the abovementioned DoD documents provide minimal
discussion and guidance on when and how burn pits should be
utilized. In fact, it was not until April 2009 (after the Burn Pit
Litigation commenced) that DoD revised the FRAGO, which now
offers specific guidance on waste disposal methods in contingency
operations and explicitly states that open burning is prohibited
unless otherwise authorized in writing. 53 Implementation of
these standards requires effective communication through the
military chains of command and civilian contractors who provide
the logistical support activities at installations abroad.
In the mid-1980s, DoD made a policy decision to use civilian
contractors to provide the military with logistical and operational
services through the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
(“LOGCAP”). 54 LOGCAP contracts allow military units to focus
on combat and mission related activities rather than expending
military personnel and expertise on logistical and operational
support services. 55 In addition, LOGCAP contracts allow the
military to identify needs and issue task orders to contractors as
required by exigent circumstances. 56 The majority of the military
base operations in Iraq and Afghanistan utilize LOGCAP
contracts. 57
LOGCAP III, first awarded in 2001 to KBR, is the contract
that supports the burn pit services in Iraq and Afghanistan. 58
KBR’s requirements and obligations are outlined in contract
52. GAO, supra note 2, at 10.
53. GAO, supra note 2, at 11.
54. Def'’s Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction at 4, In re
KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., No. 8:09-MD-02083-RWT, 2010 WL 1944178 (D. Md.
Jan. 29, 2010).
55. Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Liability of Civilian Contractors Engaged in
Providing Security or Operational Support Services Under Contract to
Department of Defense, Department of State, or Coalition Provisional Authority
for Injuries to Their Employees, Members of Armed Forces, Foreign Nationals,
and Their Survivors, 24 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 529 (2007); see also U.S. Dep’t of Army,
Reg. 700-137, Logistics Civil Augmentation Program 1 (1985) [hereinafter AR
700-137].
56. GAO, supra note 2, at 6.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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documents and the Statement of Work (“SOW”). The LOGCAP
SOW states, in relevant part, “the contractor will ensure the
safety and health of personnel, equipment and supplies. . .” 59
while providing field services including “[f]ood [s]ervice,
[m]ortuary [a]ffairs, [s]anitation to include [h]azardous [w]aste,
[b]illeting, [f]acilities [m]anagement, [m]orale [w]elfare and
[r]ecreation. . .” 60 The SOW states that the contractor will
“adhere to sound environmental practices and all applicable
Environmental Protection and Enhancement laws and
regulations” 61 and implement a hazardous materials/waste
services plan and an integrated safety and health program that
comply with “Army Regulations, NATO Status of Forces
Agreements, and federal, state and/or host country/region laws
and statutes.” 62 A former KBR logistics contract manager
testified before Congress that KBR “management would brag that
they could get away with doing anything they wanted because the
Army could not function without them. . .KBR figured that even if
they did get caught, they had already made more than enough
money to pay any fines and still make a profit.” 63
IV. LEGAL CHALLENGES FOR RECOVERY TO BURN
PIT EXPOSURE
Plaintiffs have a number of legal hurdles ahead in order to
successfully prevail in this litigation. The claims Eller et al. have
asserted include typical elements of toxic torts, such as issues of
causation. However, Defendants, government contractors, assert
various liability shields based on the theory that government
immunity should be extended to them. 64 These immunity

59. U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, LOGISTICS CIVIL AUGMENTATION PROGRAM
SUPPORT CONTRACT, NO. DAAA09-02-D-0007, STATEMENT OF WORK § 2.5.1.3
(2001) [hereinafter LOGCAP SOW].
60. Id. § 1.5.3.
61. Id. § 1.16.1.
62. Id. § 2.5.7.
63. Are Burn Pits Making Our Soldiers Sick?: Hearing Before the S.
Democratic Policy Comm., 111th Cong. 4 (2009) (statement of Rick Lamberth,
former KBR Employee).
64. Suzanne Yohannan, Defense Contractor Seeks Shield from Tort Suits
Over Burn Pit Exposures, 18 DEF. ENVTL. ALERT, No. 4, Feb. 16. 2010.
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defenses play a central role in KBR’s defense strategy because the
operation of burn pits occurs in the context of wartime operations
and is a military-authorized activity.
A. Causation
Although causation is typically a large hurdle for toxic tort
cases, it may be a non-issue in this case due to the wartime
setting, which provides Defendants alternative theories for
seeking dismissal of the case.
However, for purposes of
completeness, general issues of causation that could potentially
bar the litigation are discussed.
In a plaintiff’s effort to “prove the causal connection
between exposure and harm,” the plaintiff must show the
following three elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1)
exposure to the substance(s) of concern; (2) general causation (the
substance can cause the harm suffered); and (3) specific causation
(the substance did cause the harm suffered). 65 Meeting the
burdens of proof for causation can be a significant obstacle in
toxic tort cases and requires heavy reliance on scientific
disciplines and experts.
In applying the causation analysis, Plaintiffs can prove the
exposure to toxic smoke by first establishing, through direct
testimony, that Plaintiffs inhaled burn pit smoke. Plaintiffs
allege that their sleeping quarters would often fill with noxious
smoke, ground-level plumes would impair military operations,
and Plaintiffs would have difficultly breathing on days the pits
were in full operation. 66 Next, scientific evidence demonstrates
that the refuse stream of the burn pits (including tires, lithium
batteries, Styrofoam, paints, solvents, asbestos insulation, items
containing pesticides, polyvinyl chloride pipes, animal carcasses,
and plastic water bottles) 67 releases toxic constituents into the air
such as dioxins, particulate matter, polycyclic aromatic
hydrocarbons, volatile, organic compounds, carbon monoxide, and
65. Andrew R. Klein, Causation and Uncertainty: Making Connections in a
Time of Change, 49 JURIMETICS J. 5, 25 (2008).
66. Complaint at ¶ 15, 16, 23, 24, Robbins v. KBR, Inc., No. 109-cv-00643.
(W.D. Mich. July 14, 2009).
67. Id. at ¶ 14.
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hexachlorobenzene. 68 Moreover, DoD’s own sampling within the
vicinity of the pit burns shows toxic constituents in the air from a
number of sampling events conducted from 2004 through 2009. 69
This evidence provides the basis for Plaintiffs to show exposure to
toxic substances released from the burn pits. The general
causation prong is not a significant hurdle in this case either. It
is well documented in scientific studies that exposure to the toxic
constituents identified around the burn pits can cause the
illnesses and injuries suffered. 70
In contrast to general causation, proving specific causation
is a more complicated proposition, requiring Plaintiffs to
demonstrate that “but for” Defendants’ acts, Plaintiffs would not
have suffered the alleged harm. The soldiers in Iraq work in
harsh environments and are exposed to many elements
throughout the course of their tours that could have negative
health impacts. Many of the injuries alleged by Plaintiffs, such
as tightness in the chest, persistent cough, asthma and
bronchitis, can result from exposure to frequent sand and dust
storms and commonly impact soldiers stationed in the Middle
East. 71 These facts cut against the preponderance of evidence
threshold, under which Plaintiffs must prove that the burn pit
smoke is more likely than not the cause of their injuries. 72 In
many toxic tort cases, medical science cannot provide conclusive
evidence on the casual connection between actual injuries and the
Another causal indeterminacy is the
specific exposures. 73
development of latent illnesses by the soldiers. Latent illnesses
can cause further causation problems since latency periods allow
for more time for intervening events to occur that can further
68. Air Force Inst. for Operational Health, supra note 19. In fact, the Air
Force fact sheet states, “highly toxic dioxins, produced in small amounts in
almost all burning processes, can be produced in elevated levels with increased
combustion of plastic waste (such as discarded drinking water bottles).” Id. at
19.
69. USACHPPM, supra note 12.
70. See Are Burn Pits Making Our Soldiers Sick? Before the S. Democratic
Policy Comm., 111th Cong. 2 (Nov. 6, 2009) (statement of Dr. Anthony Szema,
Chief of the Allergy Section, Veterans Affairs Medical Center).
71. GAO, supra note 2, at 7.
72. Klein, supra note 65, at 18.
73. Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Toxic Torts at Ground Zero, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
383, 447 (2007).
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weaken the causal relationship. 74 Latent illness could be a factor
in this litigation because many Plaintiffs were exposed as early as
2004.
B. Government / Military Contractor Defenses
Another potential hurdle for Plaintiffs, in overcoming a
dismissal of their claims (and likely addressed prior to issues of
causation), is application of the government contractor defense
and other theories of derivative sovereign immunity, which could
immunize defendant KBR contractors for alleged negligent
actions. The framework for the government contractor defense is
primarily based in the Supreme Court case Boyle v. United
Technologies Corp. 75 However, to understand the government
contractor defense, one must examine the framework for the
defense, as it is based in the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”)
and related case law.
1.

FTCA and the Feres Doctrine

The FTCA, passed in 1946, allows government employees
to sue the government in situations where a private individual
would be liable under state tort law. 76 This is contrary to the
historic principles of sovereign immunity traditionally enjoyed by
the government. Sovereign immunity, carried over from English
common law, was premised on the notion that the King could do
no harm, and should be immunized from lawsuits. 77 As a limit to
sovereign immunity, the FTCA provides that the government can
be liable for:
[I]njury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused
by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of
the Government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a

74. Id.
75. See generally Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
76. HENRY COHEN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS,
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT 1 (2007).
77. 14 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
3654 (3d ed. 1969).
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private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. 78

However, the FTCA carves out a number of exceptions to the
rule where the government can still remain protected under the
The relevant
traditional notions of sovereign immunity. 79
exceptions include the “discretionary function” exception 80 and
the “combatant activities” exception. 81
In Feres v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed
whether or not the government was liable under the FTCA for
injuries to servicemen arising out activities related to military
service, since the FTCA contained no specific exception related to
military service. 82 Feres consolidated three causes of action
brought by military serviceman against the U.S. government for
negligent acts of military personnel. 83 The Court held that “the
Government is not liable under the FTCA for injuries to
servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of
activity incident to service.” 84 The Supreme Court’s reasoning,
known as the Feres Doctrine, essentially carved out another

78. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006) (emphasis added).
79. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)-(n) (2006).
80. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (“Any claim based upon an act or omission of an
employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or
regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the
Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.”).
81. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (“Any claim arising out of the combatant activities of
the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war.”).
82. COHEN, supra note 76, at 4.
83. Plaintiff executrix of Feres brought an action to recover for the death of
her husband, an active duty serviceman, who died in a fire in the quartering
barracks. Plaintiff claimed her husband’s death was a result of the military’s
negligence in housing servicemen in quarters they knew or should have known
to be unsafe. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 137 (1950). Plaintiff
Jefferson underwent an abdominal operation by Army doctors. Eight months
later, Jefferson had another unrelated operation during which the doctors
removed a towel marked “Medical Department U.S. Army” from his abdomen.
Id. Plaintiff executrix of Griggs sued for negligent medical treatment by army
surgeons. The Court found the underlying common fact to be active duty
servicemen sustaining injuries due to the alleged negligence of other military
personal. Id. at 138.
84. Feres, 340 U.S. at 146 (emphasis added).
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exception to the FTCA. 85 The Court’s decision was based
primarily on the delicate relationship between military personnel
and the Government, as well as the fact that federal law governs
the relationship. 86 The Court looked at the language of the FTCA
that waives government immunity in cases where a private
person would be liable under state law. The Court found that:

[P]laintiffs can point to no liability of a “private individual” even
remotely analogous to that which they are asserting against the
United States. We know of no American law which
ever
has
permitted a soldier to recover for negligence, against either his
superior officers or the Government he is serving. Nor is there
any liability “under like circumstances,” for no private individual
has power to conscript or mobilize a private army
with
such
authorities over persons as the Government vests in echelons of
command. 87
Feres is relevant in the government contractor immunity
framework because this was the standard first reviewed by the
Supreme Court in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., where
government contractors sought immunity from liability in the
performance of certain military contracts. The Supreme Court
failed to extend the Feres doctrine to the military government
contractors in Boyle 88 and instead developed its own test, which
allowed liability protections to apply to government contactors. 89
2.

FTCA and the Discretionary Function Exception

As government contractor services became more pervasive
in government operations, including LOGCAP contracts, courts
faced the question of whether to apply similar governmental
immunity to contractors who followed the specifications and
direction of the government. The FTCA explicitly excludes “any
contractor with the United States” from its definition of Federal

85. See McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1341 (11th
Cir. 2007).
86. Feres, 340 U.S. at 143-44, 146.
87. Id. at 141-42.
88. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 513.
89. Id. at 512.
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Agency, 90 which plainly suggests that contractors are not eligible
to utilize the FTCA liability exceptions. This fact, however, did
not preclude the Supreme Court in Boyle from holding that a
government contractor could be provided the same liability
protection as the government in certain circumstances. 91 To
establish the basis of the government contractor defense, 92 the
Supreme Court looked to the “discretionary function” exception of
the FTCA, 93 which “immunizes the United States for acts or
omissions of its employees that involve policy decisions.” 94
In Boyle, a military copilot drowned when his helicopter
crashed into the ocean and he could not escape due to the
defective design of the escape hatch. 95 The plaintiff recovered in
district court under state tort law, while the Fourth Circuit
reversed, applying a military contractor defense. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari where they articulated the rationale for
the government contractor defense and annunciated a threeprong test to determine its applicability. 96
In its simplest form, the government contractor defense
provides a liability shield from state law product liability claims
when a military contractor provides military equipment pursuit

90. See 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (2006).
91. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 513.
92. The Court choose not to extend the Feres doctrine to include government
contractors, finding that the Feres doctrine was both too board and too narrow to
be applied to the government contractor context. Id. at 510. The Court opined
that the results are too board because immunity could be applied to contractors
even when a helicopter was purchased from stock, and would be or if by chance,
the “design of the stock item contained an injury-causing attribute which
conflicted with state tort law.” Zitter, supra note 54, at 535. Additionally, the
Feres doctrine would be too narrow in that Feres applied only to injured military
personnel. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 510.
93. Specifically the FTCA exception states “[a]ny claim based upon an act or
omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the
execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be
valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an
employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.”
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
94. COHEN, supra note 76, at i.
95. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 502.
96. See id.
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to government contracts. 97 Boyle holds that state tort liability
should be displaced only where a “significant conflict exists
between an identifiable federal policy or interest and the
[operation] of state law.” 98 The basis for the displacement of
state tort law, according to the Court, is within the FTCA’s
This exception protects
discretionary function exception. 99
governmental decision-making based on public policy
considerations where the decisions made involve “an element of
judgment or choice.” 100 The exception does not apply when the
government has no choice in applying a prescribed “federal
statute, regulation, or policy.” 101 The Court in Berkovitz stated,
“if the employee’s conduct cannot appropriately be the product of
judgment or choice, then there is no discretion in the conduct for
the discretionary function exception to protect.” 102 This explains
why the Court in Boyle held that “the selection of the appropriate
design for military equipment to be used by [our] Armed Forces is
assuredly a discretionary function” within the meaning of the
FTCA. 103 Government contractor liability under state law for
military equipment design defects could create a “significant
conflict” with federal policy. 104 The Court found that declining to
extend the immunity to military government contactors and
“second guessing” the military’s procurement decisions would
“produce the same effect sought to be avoided by the FTCA
exemption.” 105
After the Court delivered its rationale for extending
immunity to government contractors, it outlined a test to ensure
the government contractor defense is applied in situations “where
97. Christopher R. Christensen & Anthony U. Battista, Brief: Framing the
Government Contractor Defense, 38 Wtr Brief 12, 13 (2009).
98. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507 (internal quotations omitted).
99. Id. at 511.
100. Berkovitz by Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511.
104. Id.
105. Id.
The Supreme Court was concerned that holding government
contractors liable would “directly affect the terms of Government contracts” and
contractors would either refuse to manufacture based on the government
specified design or would raise their contracting prices. Id. at 507; see also
Christensen & Battista, supra note 97, at 13.
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the policy of the ‘discretionary function’ would be frustrated.” 106
The test states that:
Liability for design defects in military equipment cannot be
imposed, pursuant to state law, when (1) the United States
approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment
conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the
United States about the dangers in the use of the equipment that
were known to the supplier but not to the United States. 107

The test has been applied in many factual scenarios and
has been subject to extensive litigation. One of the main issues
addressed by the circuit courts is how broadly Boyle should apply
(e.g., outside military contexts, to other product liability causes of
action, etc.). The Boyle test has been discussed in cases of
government contracts outside the military context, but courts
generally defer to the derivative sovereign immunity analysis
under Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Construction Co. for non-military
contracting situations. 108 The Supreme Court in Yearsley held
government contractors are not liable when carrying out a
“validly conferred” government contract under common law
agency theory. 109 However, in the military context, the Boyle test
has been applied to a wider range of product liability causes of
action, including failure to warn, 110 manufacturing defects, 111

106. COHEN, supra note 76, at 28.
107. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.
108. See McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1343 (11th
Cir. 2007) (discussing how the doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity had its
origin in Yearsley).
109. Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 21 (1940); see also Carley
v. Wheeled Coach, 991 F.2d 1117, 1123 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding government
contractor defense is available to nonmilitary contractors under federal common
law); Ackerson v. Bean Dredging, 589 F.3d 196, 204 (5th Cir. 2009) (applying
government contractor immunity under Yearsley).
110. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. N.Y. Asbestos Litig., 897 F.2d 626, 629 (2d
Cir. 1990) (applying Boyle to failure to warn claims).
111. The circuit courts are split on whether the defense can be applied to
manufacturing defects. See Trevino v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474,
1489 (5th Cir. 1989) (not extending government contractor defense to a
manufacturing defect cause of action), compare with Snell v. Bell Helicopter
Textron, Inc., 107 F.3d 744, 749 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that the defense can
apply to manufacturing defects).
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and service and performance contracts (as opposed to
procurement contracts). 112
The wide application and varying outcomes across the
Federal circuit and district courts make it difficult to predict how
the government contractor defense under Boyle can be applied to
the KBR LOGCAP contracts. 113 Looking at the cases that have
broadly interpreted the Boyle test to include performance or
service contracts provides a basis for understanding how the
defense could be applied to the Burn Pit Litigation.
Boyle was a product liability (design defect) cause of action
under a supply contract. The applicability of the Boyle test to
performance or logistics contacts is still largely unresolved, since
a majority of the decisions addressing the issue have been at the
district court level, with little guidance from the circuit courts. 114
In Hudgens v. Bell Helicopters, the Eleventh Circuit applied the
Boyle test to a helicopter maintenance contract finding that the
specifications provided by the government were specific enough to
protect the contractor. 115 The court stated that even though
Boyle referred to a procurement contract, the proper analysis “is
not designed to promote all-or-nothing rules regarding different
classes of contracts. Rather, the question is whether subjecting a
contractor to liability under state tort law would create a
In
significant conflict with a unique federal interest.” 116
112. See Hudgens v. Bell Helicopter, 328 F.3d 1329, 1334-35 (11th Cir. 2003)
(applying Boyle to an Army maintenance contract); Richland-Lexington Airport
v. Atlas Prop., 854 F. Supp. 400, 421-23 (D.S.C. 1994) (holding that the
government-contractor defense applies to service contracts as well as
procurement contracts, also held that the defense applies equally in nonmilitary
as well as military settings); Lamb v. Martin Marietta Energy Sys. Inc., 835 F.
Supp. 959, 966 (W.D. Ky. 1993) (finding that the government contractor defense
could be applied to an action by neighboring landowners seeking recovery for
contamination of environment against a contractor of an operations and
maintenance contract).
113. See generally Sean Watts, Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. and the
Government Contractor Defense: An Analysis Based on the Current Circuit
Split Regarding the Scope of the Defense, 40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 687 (1999).
114. Interestingly, the Supreme Court in Boyle, while discussing its prior
decision in Yearsley, suggested that the distinction between the type of contract,
procurement or performance, is not determinative. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 506.
115. Hudgens, 328 F.3d at 1334.
116. Id. (citing Glassco v. Miller Equip. Co., 966 F.2d 641, 642 (11th
Cir.1992)).
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Hudgens, the court found that the direction provided by the
maintenance protocols “involve[d] the exercise of the very same
discretion” that would be provided in a procurement contract. 117
The court’s test for preemption, paralleling Boyle, states that as
long as “prescribed maintenance procedures [are] reasonably
precise . . . to ensure that a close relationship exists between the
contract duty imposed by the federal government and the state
law duty. . .the government contractor defense will preempt.” 118
The application of the government contractor defense applied
to the Burn Pit Litigation would be highly variable depending on
the jurisdiction’s interpretation of the Boyle test. However, if a
court were to apply the analysis of Hudgens to the Burn Pit
Litigation, the court could look to Hudgens’ modified test: did the
United States approve “reasonably precise maintenance
procedures” in the contract (Boyle speaks specifically of
specifications, while Hudgens asks about maintenance
procedures); did the contractor conform to those procedures; and
was the United States warned about the dangers in relying on the
procedures. 119 However, Hudgens still poses a limitation to the
Burn Pit Litigation, since the Hudgens court addressed the facts
of a maintenance contract, arguably different to LOGCAP
logistics contracts.
However, Boyle is still the only Supreme Court test for the
government contractor defense under the FTCA. If a court were
to apply Boyle and/or Hudgens, a court would look to the extent
the government was exercising its discretionary function in
directing, approving, or controlling KBR in the waste disposal
process, thereby causing a significant conflict with federal
policy. 120
Since the litigation is currently unfolding, it is difficult to
say how much control and the level of detail the military had over
disposal of wastes during contingency operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. KBR argues in its Motion to Dismiss, along with
supporting affidavits, that there was a “pervasive ‘military
footprint’ and control over the key discretionary policies and
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id. at 1335.
Id.
See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511.
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tactical decisions as to whether, where, when, and by what means
waste would be managed and disposed.” 121 However, review of
publicly available contract documents, statements of work, DoD
instructions, field manuals, and policy, indicates there was very
little specific technical direction from the government. 122 For
example, the statement of work calls for broad declarations for
KBR to maintain the health and safety of “personnel, equipment
and supplies” 123 and to “adhere to sound environmental practices
and all applicable. . .laws and regulations.” 124 Additionally, the
field waste management technical manual only provides that
open burning should not be a regular method of solid waste
disposal and allows for interim means prior to the construction on
Application of the government
incineration facilities. 125
contractor defense under Boyle to the Burn Pit Litigation is
difficult to predict, given little precedent with LOGCAP contracts
and unfolding facts.
3.

FTCA and Combatant Activities Exception

As discussed above, the Supreme Court in Boyle found the
government contactor defense was born out of the “discretionary
function exception” of the FTCA. 126 However, the FTCA provides
other exceptions to the waiver of sovereign immunity. One
relevant exception is the “combatant activities exception,” which
protects the government from tort claims “arising out of the
combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast
Guard, during time of war.” 127 The extension of this exception to
government contractors has been successfully applied in a few

121. Memorandum in Support of Def.’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject
Matter Jurisdiction at 8, In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., No. 8:09-MD-02083RWT, 2010 WL 1944178 (D. Md. Jan. 29, 2010).
122. See, e.g.,LOGCAP SOW, supra note 59, at 23.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 9.
125. TB MED 593, supra note 50, at 7.
126. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511-12.
127. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (2006).
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instances arising out of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars; however,
the Supreme Court has yet to address it. 128
District and circuit courts have addressed the issue with
mixed results. 129 In Koohi v. United States, the Ninth Circuit
extended immunity to government contractors through the
FTCA’s “combatant activities exception.” 130 Koohi involved a
case of where an Iranian commercial airliner, taking off from a
joint military-commercial airport, was mistaken for an Iranian
fighter jet and shot down by U.S. military during a “tanker
war.” 131 The plaintiffs, heirs of deceased passengers, sued both
the United States and private contractors for defective design of a
military defense system used to shoot down the aircraft. 132 The
court extended the FTCA exception to government contractors
under the rationale that “during wartime encounters no duty of
reasonable care is owed to those against whom force is directed as
a result of authorized military action.” 133 The court then
reasoned that since the commercial airline was flying in a combat
zone and did not communicate its “civilian status,” no duty was
owed by either the U.S. or its contractors who manufactured the
defense system. 134 District courts, however, have been reluctant
to follow Koohi. 135 For example, in Fisher v. Halliburton, the
Southern District of Texas stated that the “extension of the
government contractor defense beyond its current boundaries is
unwarranted.” 136 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit in McHahon v.
Presidential Airways declined to exercise its discretion on the
128. See Zitter, supra note 55, § 7; see also McMahon v. Presidential Airways,
Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1366 (11th Cir. 2007).
129. See Zitter, supra note 55, § 7.
130. Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1333 (9th Cir. 1992).
131. Id. at 1330.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1337.
134. Id.
135. See, e.g., Lessin v. Kellog Brown & Root, No. H-05-01853, 2006 WL
3940556, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Jun. 12, 2006) (declining to extend the combatant
activities exception under the FTCA to government contractors); Smith v.
Halliburton Co., No. H-06-0462, 2006 WL 1342823, at *5 (S.D. Tex. May 16,
2006) (court was not “persuaded that the reasoning of Koohi” of extending the
combatant activities exception under the FTCA to government contractors
applied to the facts of the case).
136. Fisher v. Halliburton, 390 F. Supp. 2d 610, 616 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
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theory of preemption of government contractor liability based on
the “combatant activities exception.” 137
The D.C. Circuit most recently addressed the issue of
whether to extend the “combatant activities exception” to
government contractors in Saleh v. Titan Corp. 138 In Saleh, the
D.C. Circuit reviewed the decision of the district court, which held
that claims against government contractors involved in a service
contract providing interrogation or interpretation services at
Iraqi prisons were preempted under the FTCA “combatant
activities exception.” 139 The district court “fashioned a test of
first impression” for contractors in the combat context, which
would allow preemption when contract employees are “under the
direct command and exclusive operational control of the military
chain of command.” 140 The action against defendant Titan was
dismissed based on this test, and the plaintiff appealed;
meanwhile, the co-defendant CACI’s motion to dismiss was
denied, and defendant CACI appealed the denial. 141
In addressing the plaintiff and defendant appeals, the D.C.
Circuit agreed the district court properly focused the issues 142 but
provided a lengthy rationale on how extending liability protection
to government contractors under the FTCA’s “combatant
activities exception” squares with Boyle. 143 The crux of the D.C.
Circuit’s argument is that Boyle was premised on the “significant
conflict between federal interests and state law,” 144 and the court
looked at the FTCA exceptions “to determine that the conflict was
significant and to measure the boundaries of the conflict.” 145 In
Saleh, the D.C. Circuit applied the rationale developed in Boyle
and found that the FTCA exception on combatant activities is the
relevant exception that creates the significant conflict. 146 The
137. McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1366 (11th Cir.
2007).
138. Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 23, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
139. Saleh, 580 F.3d at 4.
140. Id. (citing Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2007)).
141. Id. at 4.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 5-8.
144. Id. at 6.
145. Saleh, 580 F.3d at 6.
146. Id.
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court went on to say that the conflict arises because combatant
activity is an area the federal government always occupies,
creating a significant conflict with state tort law- an idea the
court labels “battle-field preemption.” 147 Just as the Boyle test
was devised to ensure a government discretion function was at
stake, 148 the circuit court developed a test to outline the scope of
conflict under the “combatant activities exception.” Under the
Saleh test, “during wartime, where a private service contractor is
integrated into combatant activities, over which the military
retains command authority, a tort claim arising out of the
contractor’s engagement in such activities shall be preempted.” 149
This test is clearly favorable to defense in the Burn Pit
Litigation; however, the Eleventh Circuit recognizes that “a
service contractor might be supplying services in such a discrete
manner – perhaps even in a battlefield context – that those
services could be judged separate and apart from combat
activities of the U.S. military.” 150 This recognition by the court
could be an important factor in applying the Saleh test to the
Burn Pit Litigation if it can be shown that, although in a battle
field context, waste disposal services are performed in a “discrete
manner” that can be judged separately from the military combat
activities. The court in Saleh compares this situation to Boyle
where a government contractor contracted to supply a product,
but was not subject to “reasonably precise specifications.” 151
C. Political Question
The political question doctrine is based in the constitutional
constraint of separation of powers. The doctrine excludes from
judicial review those controversies revolving around “policy
choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for
resolution to the legislative and executive branch.” 152 In Baker v.
Carr, the Supreme Court indentified six factors that indicate the
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 9.
Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512; Saleh, 580 F.3d at 9.
16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 268 (2009).
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presence of a nonjusticiable political question. 153 Under Baker,
an issue is nonjusticiable on political question grounds if it
displays:
[1] [A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4]
the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence
to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question. 154

Often, political question cases arise in the context of foreign
relations or national security, and accordingly, the doctrine has
been used in dismissing claims against the U.S. government and
government contractors in times of war. The military wartime
cases are “an arena in which the political question doctrine has
served one of its most important and traditional functions –
precluding judicial review of decisions made by the Executive
during wartime.” 155 As such, a number of cases against military
contractors have been dismissed on political question grounds by
the district courts. 156 However, Baker notes, “not all questions
‘touching foreign relations’ are nonjusticiable.” 157 Many of the

153. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-18 (1962).
154. Id. at 217.
155. Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 558 (5th Cir. 2008).
156. See, e.g., Fisher v. Halliburton, 454 F. Supp. 2d 637, 644-45 (S.D. Tex.
2006); Lane v. Halliburton, No. H-06-1971, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63948, at *15
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 7, 2006); Smith-Idol v. Halliburton, No. H-06-1168, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 75574, at *6 (S.D. Tex., Oct. 11, 2006); Smith v. Halliburton Co.,
No. H-06-0462, 2006 WL 2521326, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2006); Carmichael v.
Kellog, Brown & Root Serv., Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1372 (N.D. Ga. 2008);
Whitaker v. Kellog Brown & Root, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1282 (M.D. Ga.
2006).
157. Lane, 529 F.3d at 559 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 211).
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district court decisions that hastily dismissed a plaintiff’s claims
have been reversed or are pending appeal in the circuit courts. 158
Lane v. Halliburton and Carmichael v. KBR, two cases
involving LOGCAP contracts during the Iraq war, came to
different results with similar facts involving accidents during
military convoys. Both circuits suggested that the backdrop of
the Iraq war posed serious concerns for “second-guessing the acts
and decisions of the Army,” 159 which are normally “insulated
from judicial review” 160 under the political question doctrine. In
Lane v. Halliburton, the Fifth Circuit reserved three district court
cases in a consolidated appeal, holding that the political question
doctrine does not necessarily bar tort claims against government
contractors performing support services under LOGCAP contracts
even when “political questions. . .loom so large in the
background.” 161 The decision was based largely on the fact that
the plaintiffs’ claims were for fraud and misrepresentation, and
as such, the court felt there was no lack of judicially manageable
standards to judge the negligence. 162 Even though the factual
setting was in the context of military activities, the claims could
be resolved with “ordinary” fraud and misrepresentation
standards without making an “impermissible review of wartime
decision-making.” 163
KBR in the Burn Pit Litigation would likely rely on the
Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Carmichael v. KBR, affirming the
grant of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on
The Eleventh
nonjusticiable political question grounds. 164
Circuit found that the facts of the case would require

158. See id. at 548 (consolidating and reversing district court cases Fisher v.
Halliburton, Lane v. Halliburton, and Smith-Idol v. Halliburton, holding
plaintiffs claims were not barred by the political question doctrine); McMahon v.
Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1365 (11th Cir. 2007) (affirming lower
court’s decision declining to dismiss plaintiff’s cause of action on political
questions grounds).
159. Lane, 529 F.3d at 567.
160. Carmichael v. Kellog, Brown & Root Serv., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271, 1275,
1280 (11th Cir. 2009).
161. Lane, 529 F.3d at 568.
162. Id. at 561.
163. Id. at 568.
164. Carmichael, 572 F.3d at 1275.
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“reexamination of many sensitive judgments and decisions
entrusted to the military in a time of war.” 165 In Carmichael, the
plaintiffs’ claims were based on negligent actions of the contractor
during a military convey; however, the plaintiffs could not show
that the military did not exercise complete control over the
convoy. 166 The defense’s evidence indicated that the military, not
the contractor, was in control regarding all convey decisions, such
as arranging, routing, and providing the security measures to be
employed. 167 In the Burn Pit Litigation, KBR asserts a similar
evidentiary basis, attempting to show that KBR had no hand in
the decision-making process for waste disposal. 168 If KBR can
establish their actions were solely based on military directives,
policies, and judgments, it will be difficult for the court to review
Plaintiffs’ claims without reviewing, reexamining, and “secondguessing” critical and sensitive military policies decisions.
Even if Plaintiffs can establish that KBR had much more
control over the burn pits than is suggested in the Motion to
Dismiss, the Baker factor of “judicially manageable standards”
poses limitations. In McMahon, the political question doctrine
did not bar the plaintiff’s wrongful death action for soldiers that
were killed during a plane crash operated by the defendants
through a transportation services contract in Afghanistan. 169
McMahon found that the defendants did not establish the
presence of the Baker factors to warrant dismissal based on a
political question. In particular, although in a wartime context, it
was asserted that the defendants negligently staffed, equipped,
and operated the flight that crashed. 170 The court found, “as in
any tort suit involving a plane crash, the court will simply have to
determine whether the choices Presidential made were negligent.
165. Carmichael, 572 F.3d at 1281.
166. Id. at 1283.
167. Id. at 1277.
168. See Memorandum in Support of Def.’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Subject Matter Jurisdiction at 13-19, In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., No. 8:09MD-02083-RWT, 2010 WL 1944178 (D. Md. Jan. 29, 2010) (discussing the
military’s role in burn pit waste disposal methods); see also Carmichael, 572
F.3d at 1275.
169. McMahon v. Presidential Airways Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1336 (11th Cir.
2007).
170. Id. at 1363-64.
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It is well within the competence of a federal court to apply
negligence standards to a plane crash.” 171 The court continued by
acknowledging “that flying over Afghanistan during wartime is
different from flying over Kansas on a sunny day,” but that fact
did not make the “flexible standards of negligence” unmanageable
for judicial review. 172 On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit stated
that courts dealing with situations involving military combat or
training are not capable of “developing judicially manageable
standards.” 173
In the case of KBR Burn Pit Litigation, Defendants argue
there are no standards for a court to judge the actions of KBR
employees when the U.S. military directed KBR. KBR contends
that the reasonable person standard is not applicable here
because the case is not “a garden variety toxic tort suit.” 174 What
is compelling and problematic for Plaintiffs is that, although
waste disposal, via open burning, is strictly prohibited in the U.S.
and presents a clear standard for cases on domestic soil, there is
no standard available to judge reasonableness of care or duty
when burn pit use in wartime scenarios is permitted by the
military.
The Carmichael court comments, “in the typical
negligence action, judges and juries are able to draw upon
common sense and everyday experience” to determine if a
defendant acted reasonably in a given situation. 175
V. CONCLUSION
Based upon a review of case law, there are many
unresolved issues regarding how a reviewing court might address
certain defenses in the KBR Burn Pit Litigation.
Which
government contractor test will a court employ – the Supreme
Court’s Boyle test, or the Saleh test? Can the issues of waste
disposal be separated out from governmental decision-making to
171. Id. at 1364.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Memorandum in Support of Def.’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject
Matter Jurisdiction at 33, In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., No. 8:09-MD-02083RWT, 2010 WL 1944178 (D. Md. Jan. 29, 2010).
175. Carmichael v. Kellog, Brown & Root Serv., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271,1289 (11th
Cir. 2009).
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escape dismissal based on political question? Or could derivative
sovereign immunity principles play a role in barring the claims?
What is clear, however, is none of the tests or standards
discussed within this article are sufficient to address the liability
of government contractors under military logistics and
performance contracts in the wartime context. The FTCA, the
Feres doctrine, and the Boyle decision could not imagine the scope
of military contracting taking over roles that once were
exclusively conducted by military personnel. The Boyle test is
likely too narrow to address LOGCAP contracts dealing with
waste disposal services, while Hudgens and Saleh have their own
limitations. Although Hudgens addressed a maintenance services
contract, the government specifications for conduct under this
contract were still fairly well defined, allowing the court to
effectively modify the Boyle test. Although the Boyle court
suggested it should not matter what type of contract it is, the
Boyle test is extremely difficult to apply because LOGCAP
contracts by their nature lack the specificity of supply
contracts. 176 Application of Saleh presents limitations to the
Burn Pit Litigation as well. The Saleh test applies to combatant
activities; although burn pit operation and use occurred during
wartime in a combatant zone, the activity itself is not combative.
The lack of a clear test for holding government military
contracts liable under LOGCAP contracts poses significant issues
for Plaintiffs in the Burn Pit Litigation. Although Plaintiffs
intend to litigate this suit as a “garden variety toxic tort” case, 177
the factual complexities will pose concern for a reviewing court in
determining whether the negligence claims can be judged as such
and not be influenced by the wartime context and setting.

176. See Justin Jacobs, The Boyle Test is an Insufficient Standard for
Determining Whether to Allow Private Military Contractors to Assert the
Government Contractor Defense, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1377, 1399 (2008); see also
Rebecca Rafferty Veron, The Future of Competitive Sourcing, Battlefield
Contractors: Facing the Tough Issues, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 369, 381 (2004).
177. Memorandum in Support of Def.’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject
Matter Jurisdiction at 33, In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., No. 8:09-MD-02083RWT, 2010 WL 1944178 (D. Md. Jan. 29, 2010).
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